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COMMENTS




Tax considerations are important in most transactions today.
This is true of damage awards and settlements in personal injury
and wrongful death litigation. Counsel for plaintiffs and defen-
dants should be aware of how receipts and payments will affect
their clients' income taxes when they negotiate settlements. Fur-
ther, if settlement cannot be reached, the question arises whether
evidence should be presented to the jury on the tax consequences
of a verdict. The following comment explores the inclusion in and
deduction from gross income of damages and settlements, and the
possibility of presenting evidence and instructing juries on tax
consequences.
II. TAXATION OF PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES AND SETTLEMENTS
A. Inclusion in Gross Income
1. Compensatory Damages
If the plaintiff and the defendant negotiate a settlement, or if
a court awards the plaintiff damages, the issue arises whether the
amount received is taxable. To calculate taxable income a taxpayer
must first compute gross income. The Internal Revenue Code
[hereinafter I.R.C.] includes in gross income "all income from
whatever source derived."' In order for an item to be excluded
from gross income, the I.R.C. must specifically provide an exclu-
sion. The exclusion for personal injury damages is provided in
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) as follows:
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in ex-
cess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical,
1. I.R.C. § 61 (1984).
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etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not
include- . . . the amount of any damages received (whether by
suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic pay-
ments) on account of personal injuries or sickness .... '
Broadly stated, the effect of section 104(a)(2) is to exclude
damages or amounts received in settlement on account of personal
injuries Various reasons have been given as to why Congress en-
acted section 104(a)(2). One is that the amount received is in ex-
change for one's personal capital.' Another is that Congress in-
tended to convey a tax benefit to those suffering personal injuries.'
Significantly, the exclusion applies only to amounts received
for tort-type claims. A person may not claim an exclusion for the
proceeds from the sale of a part of his body,' nor may he enter into
an agreement before the injury or claim arises and hope to exclude
the proceeds.7 Further, only amounts received in settlement of the
tortfeasor's obligation may be excluded. Consequently, interest or
other income received from the settlement or award is includible in
gross income?
The exclusion of the award itself and the inclusion of interest
on the award provide a significant incentive in settlement negotia-
tions for the defendant to pay a yearly annuity rather than a lump
sum. If the amount received by the plaintiff arises from a personal
injury, then the full amount of each yearly payment may be ex-
cluded from gross income, whereas yearly interest received on a
lump sum is taxable in the year the interest is received
One element of damages that a taxpayer might receive is com-
pensation for lost future income. Had the taxpayer not been in-
2. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1984).
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1960).
4. See Starrels v. Comm'r, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962); and Hawkins v. Comm'r,
6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024-25 (1927): "Here there is only the compensation which the law sanctions
as the only remedy which has thus far been devised for an injury which in its nature is
wholly personal and nonpecuniary."
5. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81, 84-85 (1957); Epmeier v. United States,
199 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1952); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 87 (D.N.J. 1975).
6. In United States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1979), the taxpayer attempted to
exclude amounts received for the sale of her blood. Since no tort liability had been involved,
however, the § 104(a)(2) exclusion was held not applicable.
7. Roosevelt v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 77 (1964), involved a taxpayer's agreement with a
stage-play producer whereby the parties provided by contract that money paid to Roosevelt
would be compensation for invasion of privacy. The court held that no tort occurred, how-
ever, since by entering into the contract Roosevelt had given his consent. Id. at 86.
8. Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59.
9. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) excludes damages received, whether as lump sums or as periodic
payments. See also Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59; Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74.
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jured, he would have been able to work. Since the earnings from
his employment would have been includible in his taxable income,
the question arises as to whether damages for lost earnings are in-
cludible in gross income. Because future earnings, in a tort action,
are simply a measure of the harm resulting from a personal injury,
and because damages on account of personal injuries are excluda-
ble from gross income, lost future earnings have always been con-
sidered excludable by the Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter
I.R.S.]. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Roemer
v. Commissioner:'0
An individual who wins a personal injury suit is usually given
a lump sum award that includes an amount for items that ordina-
rily would be taxable, such as lost income. Although it might be
logical to allocate a lump sum award between its excludable and
taxable components, the Commissioner has long excluded from
income the entire monetary judgment. . . [A] lump sum award
is not allocated between the personal aspects of the injury and
the economic loss occasioned by the personal injury, nor is the
taxpayer precluded from use of section 104(a)(2) when the pre-
dominant result of the injury is a loss of income."
2. Medical Expenses
Two exceptions exist to the general rule that damages received
on account of personal injuries are excludable from gross income.
The first exception is for damages received for medical expenses.
I.R.C. § 104(a) grants the exclusion "except in the case of amounts
attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under
section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) ...."' If a plain-
tiff previously deducted medical or other expenses in calculating
his taxable income, he must include in his gross income the part of
the damages received that is allocable to those previously deducted
expenses." If the judgment or settlement agreement includes a
reasonable allocation, this allocation will be used. Otherwise, the
amount allocable should be the amount of the expenses previously
deducted, if the damages are equal to or greater than this
amount. "
The settlement agreement may also allocate an amount to
compensate for future medical expenses arising from the injury
10. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
11. Id. at 696-97.
12. I.R.C. § 104(a) (1984).
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suffered. If so, the future expenses actually incurred to the extent
of the allocation will not be deductible in computing federal in-
come tax liability. 5 Expenses incurred above the amount allocated,
however, will be deductible."6
3. Punitive Damages
Despite former I.R.S. policy to the contrary, punitive damages
may be a second exception to the general rule that damages arising
from personal injuries are excludable. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) provides
that "gross income does not include . . . the amount of any dam-
ages received . . 7 The wording seems clear and unambiguous
and for years the I.R.S. advised that punitive damages received on
account of personal injuries were excludable because the statute
clearly said so.18 Further, the Treasury Regulations define "dam-
ages received" as: "an amount received . . . through prosecution of
a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through
a settlement entered into in lieu of such prosecution."1 9 It would
appear, then, that punitive damages fall within this definition.
On July 16, 1984, however, the I.R.S. issued a new revenue
ruling that reversed its earlier stance: "An award of punitive dam-
ages. . . does not compensate a taxpayer for a loss but adds to the
taxpayer's wealth. Furthermore, punitive damages are awarded not
'on account of personal injury,' as required by section 104(a)(2),
but are determined with reference to the defendant's degree of
fault."20 To support its latest ruling, the I.R.S. relied on Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.2"
Although no personal injury had been involved in Glenshaw,
the Court stated in a footnote that personal injury damages are
nontaxable because they correspond to a return of capital and thus
are by definition compensatory. The Court further explained that
this reasoning does not apply to punitive damage awards.22
Thus, while the underlying policy appears to support the in-
15. Rev. Rul. 75-232, 1975-1 C.B. 94.
16. Id. at 95.
17. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1984) (emphasis added).
18. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. See also Roemer, 716 F.2d at 700.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1960).
20. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-29 I.R.B. 5, 7. Technically, both Revenue Rulings 75-45 and
84-108 involve wrongful death cases. But damages for wrongful death have always been con-
sidered personal injury damages. See Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 628-29
(D.S.C. 1967); Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
21. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). Glenshaw involved a taxpayer's attempt to exclude punitive
damages received on account of fraud and anti-trust violations.
22. Id. at 432 n.8.
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clusion of punitive damages in gross income, a literal reading of
both the I.R.C. and the Treasury Regulations supports the exclu-
sion of punitive damages from gross income. Given this incon-
gruity, the matter promises to be a subject of controversy.
B. Deductibility of Civil Judgments and Settlements
While plaintiffs want to exclude from gross income the
amount of damages received, defendants hope to deduct any pay-
ments made. The I.R.C. does not specifically provide for deduction
of damages. As a result, a defendant need not concern himself with
whether the claim arises from a personal injury, breach of contract,
or other claim. Instead, if a defendant wants to deduct damage
payments, he must show that the payments are ordinary and nec-
essary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business, or that
they are incurred in the production of income. 3 If the payment is
not an ordinary and necessary expense, it might be capitalized as
part of the cost of an asset, or it could be nondeductible for some
other reason, depending on the origin and nature of the claim.
At one time, courts allowed damage payments to be deducted
if the taxpayer's primary purpose in settling was to prevent ad-
verse effects on its operations.24 The problem with relying upon the
taxpayer's primary purpose in settling a claim, however, is that it
is a subjective test. Thus, the courts have fashioned another test to
determine whether damage payments are currently deductible:
they look at the origin and character of the plaintiff's claim.2 5
Under the objective origin of the claim test, payments are deducti-
ble if the claim arises from ordinary and necessary business activi-
ties.2 6 Thus, damages paid for libel have been held deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses when a newspaper editor
unlawfully criticized his competition during the course of an inter-
view.2 7 In another case, Mulgrew Blacktop, Inc. v. United States,2"
a corporation's deduction of a payment made in settlement of an
23. I.R.C. §§ 162, 212 (1984). Sometimes taxpayers also argue the deductibility as a
loss under I.R.C. § 165. The Tax Court, however, has avoided discussion of § 165 in favor of
§ 162. See Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 15 (1967).
24. See Anchor Coupling Co., Inc. v. United States, 427 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
25. Id. at 432-33.
26. The timing of the deduction is another matter. I.R.C. § 461(h) (1984), added by
the Tax Reform Act of 1984, will cause payments arising from workers' compensation or tort
claims to be deductible when the payments are made. Other payments are deductible in
"the proper taxable year under the method of accounting used in computing taxable in-
come." I.R.C. § 461(a) (1984).
27. Vanderbilt v. Comm'r, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) (1957).
28. 311 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Iowa 1969).
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automobile accident was upheld as a trade or business expense
under I.R.C. § 162. The court found that the payment arose out of
the ownership of the car, that the car was owned in the course of
the corporation's business, and that it had been driven with the
consent of the corporation. "Such expenses are ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses deductible in the year incurred."29
Deductions are not allowed, however, for payments made to
settle title to assets or for claims arising from a corporation's capi-
tal stock.30 Moreover, the taxpayer's reason for settling a claim is
irrelevant. Thus, a taxpayer might settle a claim in order to facili-
tate the sale of its assets or to avoid adverse effects on the market
price of its stock. Such payments are deductible as long as the
claim arose from some ordinary and necessary activity incurred in
the business operation. On the other hand, if the claim does not
arise from an ordinary and necessary business activity, but the tax-
payer settles to avoid adverse publicity on its operations, the test
is not met and the payment is not deductible under I.R.C. § 162.31
Assuming that a taxpayer can show that damage payments are
deductible as ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses or
expenses incurred in the production of income, a further question
arises as to whether he can deduct the punitive element of those
damages. Although it might seem that deducting punitive damages
would be contrary to public policy, they generally are deductible.
The Treasury Regulations provide that "[a] deduction for an ex-
pense paid or incurred . . . which would otherwise be allowable
under section 162 shall not be denied on the grounds that allow-
ance of such deduction would frustrate a sharply defined public
policy. '" 2 The I.R.S. has also issued a revenue ruling which pro-
vides that punitive damages incurred in the ordinary conduct of
business are deductible under I.R.C. § 162.11 This ruling relies on
the fact that the only payments prohibited as deductions under
section 162 are those prohibiting deduction of fines or penalties
paid for the violation of a law, portions of anti-trust treble damage
29. Id. at 572.
30. In Anchor Coupling the taxpayer breached an agreement to allow Borg-Warner
Corp. to purchase its assets. Borg-Warner sued, and Anchor Coupling settled the lawsuit for
$600,000. This payment was a non-deductible capital expenditure because it was made to
settle title to Anchor Coupling's assets. Anchor Coupling, 427 F.2d at 433.
31. See Vermont Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 682 (D. Vt. 1969),
where the taxpayer settled a dissenting stockholder's claim that her shares had been under-
valued during a merger. Even though the taxpayer contended the shareholder's claim was
merely a nuisance suit, the court held amounts paid to the stockholder represented addi-
tional sums paid to purchase the treasury stock. Hence, they were nondeductible.
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1984).
33. Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57.
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payments, bribes, and kickbacks.3
In sum, damages incurred in civil litigation are deductible if
the origin and nature of the plaintiff's claim arises from the ordi-
nary conduct of the taxpayer's business or income-producing activ-
ities. Such payments may be deductible regardless of whether they
are for compensatory or punitive damages.
III. PROPRIETY OF ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF TAX CONSEQUENCES
AND INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S AWARD IS
NONTAXABLE
Since damages received by a plaintiff in a personal injury ac-
tion generally. result in no tax liability for the plaintiff, issues arise
in many lawsuits as to whether the defendant should be allowed to
present evidence of the plaintiff's income tax bracket and whether
the court should instruct the jury that the award will not be sub-
ject to tax. Defendants want the instruction, believing that it will
result in lower verdicts. For the same reason, plaintiffs want no
reference made to income taxes.
Historically, most courts had adopted the rule that juries
should not be instructed and evidence should not be admitted re-
garding plaintiffs' income taxes. 5 In 1980, however, the United
States Supreme Court decided in Norfolk & Western Railway Co.
v. Liepelt 6 that instructions and evidence should have been given
at a trial involving the Federal Employers' Liability Act [hereinaf-
ter FELA]. In the wake of Liepelt, state and federal courts have
begun to rethink their positions on these issues, which include:
1. Should evidence of the plaintiff's future income taxes be
admissible?
2. Should juries be instructed on tax consequences of the
plaintiff's damage awards?
3. Should the choice of forum matter?
4. Will the difference in tax consequences between compen-
satory and punitive damages cause jury instructions to be too
confusing?
5. Should juries be instructed that punitive damages are tax
deductible by the defendant?
The remainder of this comment addresses these issues.
34. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 522, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2310).
35. This is the rule in Montana as well; see Bracy v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 136
Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848 (1959).
36. 444 U.S. 490 (1980). Liepelt arose out of a wrongful death action.
37. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
19851
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A. The Liepelt Decision
Prior to Liepelt, most courts had adopted the view that jury
instructions and evidence relating to income taxes were improper.
In Liepelt, the Supreme Court accepted certiorari because it be-
lieved that tax consequences are more significant now than they
once were.38 Further, the Court noted a shift in the position of
some courts allowing instructions and evidence regarding tax
consequences.3 9
The Liepelt Court acknowledged that there were reasons both
for and against admitting evidence of and instructions regarding
potential income tax effects. The most convincing argument that
the Court noted for admission is that after-tax income is the real
measure of financial loss suffered by the plaintiff, not gross in-
come.40 The Court also realized, however, that the prediction of
future tax consequences is speculative and possibly too complex
for a jury.41 Further, the Court acknowledged that if such evidence
is admitted and the jury is instructed accordingly, then possibly
other evidence ought to be admitted, such as evidence of future
taxes estimated to be paid on interest earned from investment of
the award and evidence of attorney's fees necessary to recover the
award.42
In dismissing Liepelt's arguments that a jury should not hear
evidence of future income tax consequences, the Court concluded
that if future income taxes are difficult to estimate, so are many
other estimates necessary to decide a case.' 3 The Court also re-
jected Liepelt's argument that other evidence should also be ad-
mitted if evidence of future taxes must be allowed. 4
The Court believed that while a jury would tend to be con-
scious of income taxes, it would be unaware of the exclusion for
personal injury damages under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Consequently,
the Court reasoned, the failure to instruct a jury that "the plain-
tiff's award, if any, will not be subject to tax" is likely to produce a
higher verdict than should be given.' 5 The Court concluded by
38. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 491.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 493.
41. Id. at 494.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 495. The Court thought that "logically" an award comprising the discounted
present value of future earnings should be adjusted upward for the effect of income taxes on
earnings from investment of the award. Evidence of attorney's fees, however, should not be
considered by a jury because the FELA does not provide for their recovery.
45. Id. at 497.
[Vol. 46
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quoting from Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger,'6 a 1975
Ninth Circuit FELA decision: "'[T]o put the matter simply, giving
the instruction can do no harm, and it can certainly help by
preventing the jury from inflating the award and thus overcompen-
sating the plaintiff on the basis of an erroneous assumption that
the judgment will be taxable.'""
B. Decisions Subsequent to Liepelt
Some state courts have followed the Liepelt ruling while
others, not wishing to change the law in their jurisdictions, ques-
tion how far the Liepelt rule actually extends. Thus, to date, dif-
ferences in substantive and procedural law have figured signifi-
cantly in determining the outcome of disputes over jury
instructions and evidence. Accordingly, decisions involving differ-
ing combinations of substantive and procedural law must be
analyzed.
1. Federal Substantive Law
After Liepelt it is clear that any court relying on federal sub-
stantive law must allow introduction of evidence of the plaintiff's
estimated future income taxes and must instruct the jury that a
damage award will not be subject to income tax. Thus, for exam-
ple, federal and state courts48 must allow introduction of tax evi-
dence and instruct juries accordingly in FELA actions or suits
brought under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act."9
2. Federal Substantive Law Incorporating State Substantive
Law
When a federal act incorporates state substantive law, how-
ever, a different result may be reached. After Liepelt, the Supreme
Court in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.50 considered the ne-
cessity of instructing the jury that damages awarded would not be
taxable to the plaintiff in a suit brought under the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act. 51 The Court stated that the rule given in
46. 529 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1975).
47. Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 498, quoting Boxberger, 529 F.2d at 297.
48. Liepelt originated in an Illinois state court.
49. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982). See Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 678 F.2d 424 (2d
Cir. 1982).
50. 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
51. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1982).
1985]
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Liepelt was generally applicable to federal damages actions,5" but
added that a court must look to the provisions of the federal act in
question before it can decide whether the rule applies.5 3 Since the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act provides that state law applies
to the extent that it is not "inconsistent" with federal law,54 the
Supreme Court remanded the case to determine what the state
rule was regarding damages. 55
Unfortunately, it is not clear what the Court meant by the
word "inconsistent." For instance, if state law did not allow such
instructions, then the state law would apparently be inconsistent
with the federal law announced in Liepelt. The Gulf Court left the
issue unresolved.
The Federal Tort Claims Act 5" [hereinafter FTCA] is another
federal statute which incorporates state substantive law. The
FTCA provides that state law determines the measure of damages,
but, among other exceptions, it precludes awards of punitive dam-
ages.57 The FTCA is a waiver by the United States of its sovereign
immunity from suit, and as such, conditions attached to the waiver
must be strictly enforced. 8
Regardless of how state law might characterize compensatory
damages, federal courts will look at the consequences of a particu-
lar measure to determine whether, as a matter of federal law, it is
punitive.5 9 Thus, in Hollinger v. United States,60 an FTCA action
decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court required
that estimated income taxes be deducted from a plaintiff's award.
The court reasoned that to award more would amount to granting
punitive damages. 1
3. State Substantive Law
a. Federal Forum
Since state substantive law, not federal substantive law, is ap-
plied in federal courts in diversity cases, it would seem that
Liepelt would not dictate admitting evidence and instructing juries
52. Gulf, 453 U.S. at 488.
53. Id.
54. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1982).
55. Gulf, 453 U.S. at 487-88.
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
58. Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111-12 (4th Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 110 (citing D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1973)).
60. 651 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1981).
61. Id. at 642.
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on tax effects in diversity cases. Several early post-Liepelt cases
demonstrate this view.
In Estate of Spinosa v. International Harvester Co.,62 a diver-
sity case involving New Hampshire law,63 the First Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that a jury instruction on tax consequences had
been properly excluded. The Spinosa court held that the Liepelt
decision did not mandate an across-the-board change in the major-
ity rule regarding calculation of a decedent's projected future earn-
ings. Although no New Hampshire case law existed on point, the
federal appellate court found that it was proper for the trial court
to apply the majority rule as it had in the past.6 4
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Croce v.
Bromley Corp.65 decided to apply state law rather than the Liepelt
rule in a wrongful death action arising out of an airplane crash.
The suit had been brought under a state statute rather than fed-
eral law, and the trial court had refused to instruct the jury on the
nontaxability of the award. The court saw this as a crucial distinc-
tion,66 and found no suggestion that the Supreme Court in Liepelt
had intended to require a trial judge to give such an instruction in
wrongful death actions predicated upon state law.67
Other circuit courts of appeal, on the other hand, have applied
the Leipelt rules in diversity cases. In Grant v. City of Duluth68
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that Minnesota law
did not require a trial court to instruct a jury regarding income tax
effects in a wrongful death action. The court, however, favored the
policy enunciated in Liepelt and held that the jury should have
been so instructed. 9 In addition, the court suggested that due pro-
cess might require giving the instruction, but it declined to
elaborate. 0
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently de-
cided in a diversity case arising under Illinois law, In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Chicago, Ill.,71 that evidence of income tax conse-
quences was properly admitted and that the jury had been prop-
62. 621 F.2d 1154 (1st Cir. 1980).
63. Id. at 1158.
64. Id.
65. 623 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1980).
66. Id. at 1096.
67. Id. at 1097. The court also noted the absence of inflated damages which would
have indicated that the jury was unaware of the exclusion of damages from the plaintiff's
gross income. Id.
68. 672 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 683.
70. Id.
71. 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1983).
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erly instructed concerning the effect of income taxes.72 Addressing
the issue of whether evidence of income taxes ought to be admitted
at trial, even though state substantive law controls in a diversity
case, the appeals court turned to Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, ex-
cept as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Ev-
idence which is not relevant is not admissible. '7 The court then
reasoned that since the Supreme Court in Liepelt had held that
such evidence was relevant, 74 it is thus generally admissible in fed-
eral court.75
The court did acknowledge, however, that in some circum-
stances state substantive law might still apply in determining the
admissibility of evidence in a federal diversity case: "[T]he rele-
vance of the evidence is ascertainable only by reference to the sub-
stantive law of the state. To the extent that the state evidentiary
rule defines what is sought to be proved-here, the measure of
damages-it may bind the federal court . ,,.6 The court then
reviewed several situations in which state substantive law might be
so intertwined with the measure of damages that a federal court
would find it necessary to apply the state rule regarding admissi-
bility of income tax consequences. First, a state rule might be
based upon the premise that computation of net income is too
speculative or confusing because of tax rate fluctuations and the
prediction of exclusions and exemptions. 77 Second, state substan-
tive law could be based upon the notion "that inaccuracies result-
ing from the projection of gross rather than net income are offset
by the undercompensating effects of ignoring inflation and attor-
ney's fees ....1,,8
The Air Crash Disaster court considered another rationale for
permitting state law to control. Since Liepelt requires state courts
to apply federal admissibility rules in federal actions, the reverse
72. Id. at 1193.
73. FED. R. EVID. 402.
74. Air Crash Disaster, 701 F.2d at 1192 (citing Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 495). FED. R. EVID.
401 provides that relevant evidence "means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."
75. Air Crash Disaster, 701 F.2d at 1192-93.
76. Id. at 1193-94. On the other hand, rather than being based upon evidentiary con-
siderations, this could merely be a statement about the ability of a particular state's juries
to comprehend tax consequences.
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also might be true: federal courts should apply state admissibility
rules in diversity actions. 7 9 Nevertheless, the court was not con-
vinced that this conclusion was always warranted: "Liepelt ex-
pressly relied on the overwhelming federal interest in uniformity of
practice under FELA, and the supremacy clause gives the federal
government power to impose even a procedural rule on state courts
in these circumstances."' 0
Thus, the Air Crash Disaster court concluded that the Federal
Rules of Evidence govern admissibility of evidence in a diversity
case, unless state substantive law is so inextricably tied to the mea-
sure of damages that it must be followed. Deciding whether a state
evidentiary rule should apply in a diversity case would be difficult
when the state rule is that evidence of income tax consequences is
inadmissible. 1 However, since the Air Crash Disaster Court be-
lieved that Illinois courts would admit evidence of the plaintiff's
income taxes, it held that state substantive law did not preclude
admission of the evidence.8 1
The court next decided whether juries should be instructed
that the plaintiff's award, if any, would not be subject to tax: "Or-
dinarily in diversity cases state law determines the content of jury
instructions, and federal law governs only the manner in which in-
structions are requested and given."83 This is the rule, because jury
instructions contain the substantive law to be applied to the facts.
In Air Crash Disaster, however, the court believed that the Illinois
courts' refusal to instruct juries regarding tax effects had been due
either to administrative concerns,84 or to mistaken views of federal
tax law. 5 Since no substantive legal concern was present, the court
concluded that it was not bound by the Illinois practice.8 6
The Air Crash Disaster decision illustrates a potential advan-
tage for defendants in federal courts, including those in Montana.
Montana state courts, like those in Illinois, have held that juries
are not to be instructed on the non-taxability of damage awards. If
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1195.
81. Id. at 1193.
82. Id. at 1195.
83. Id. at 1199.
84. Id. at 1200. The court cited two such concerns: (1) Illinois courts believed that
instruction was unnecessary if the measure of damages is made clear; and (2) giving this
particular cautionary instruction would invite a flood of others. The court did not fear either
at the federal level. Id.
85. Id. at 1199-1200. Illinois courts had previously stated that the federal tax exclusion
for personal injury damage awards was intended to convey a tax benefit to the recipient.
The Air Crash Disaster court cited Liepelt and said no such tax benefit was intended. Id.
86. Id. at 1200.
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a Montana federal district court concludes that evidence of a
plaintiff's income taxes is relevant, and that the Montana Supreme
Court has no substantive reason to oppose instructing juries on the
consequences of income taxes to the plaintiff, then the federal
court might well follow the Seventh Circuit's decision in Air Crash
Disaster.
b. State Forum
In Liepelt, the United States Supreme Court did not extend
its holding to state courts deciding state substantive law." Most of
the state courts that, prior to Liepelt, had held that evidence of
and jury instructions relating to income taxes were improper have
not been persuaded by Liepelt to abandon that rule. An example
of this reaction to Liepelt is Irwin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines,58
where a California appeals court recognized that California courts
had always refused to instruct juries on the tax effects of personal
injury awards and decided to continue to do so.8 9 Deciding that
Liepelt pertained only to the interpretation of federal statutory
claims, the court concluded that it was not bound to follow the
Supreme Court when a case is brought under state law.90 Appellate
courts in Pennsylvania,91 Illinois,92 and Washington9 3 have reached
the same conclusion. The issue, however, has not yet reached these
states' highest courts.
The Montana Supreme Court has held in the past that evi-
dence should not be presented and that juries should not be in-
structed on the effects of income taxes on damage awards. All of
these decisions, however, arose from FELA actions. When first
presented with the issue in 1959, in Bracy v. Great Northern Rail-
way Co.,9' the court refused to permit the instruction. The com-
mon sense view, according to the court, was that future tax liabil-
ity is subject to too many variables to be considered in an award
for impairment of future earnings." While the court recognized
87. 444 U.S. at 490. The Court decided the tax issues only with respect to Liepelt.
88. 133 Cal. App. 3d 709, 184 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1982).
89. Id. at 717, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
90. Id.
91. Richardson v. LaBuz, - Pa. Commw. -, 474 A.2d 1181, 1197 (1984).
92. Tonarelli v. Gibbons, 121 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 460 N.E.2d 464 (1984); McCann v.
Lisle-Woodridge Fire Protection Dist., 115 Ill. App. 3d 702, 450 N.E.2d 1311 (1983); John-
son v. Hoover Water Well Serv., Inc., 108 Ill. App. 3d 994, 439 N.E.2d 1284 (1982).
93. Bingaman v. Grays Harbor Community Hosp., 37 Wash. App. 829, 685 P.2d 1090
(1984); Maicke v. RDH, Inc., 37 Wash. App. 750, 683 P.2d 227 (1984).
94. 136 Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848 (1959).
95. Id. at 74, 343 P.2d at 853.
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some division among other jurisdictions, it found the general rule
to be that the instruction should not be given. Further, it believed
that when a jury is instructed on what it may consider in arriving
at a verdict, the judge should not instruct on what the jury is not
permitted to consider."
In 1977, in Torchia v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,97 another
FELA case, the court again approved a trial court's refusal to in-
struct a jury that personal injury damages were not taxable, find-
ing the refusal to be "in accord with the weight of authority." '
Although the Torchia court discussed the Ninth Circuit's
Boxberger decision, from which the Supreme Court later quoted
approvingly in Liepelt, the Montana court was unimpressed.99
Nevertheless because of the Liepelt decision, the Montana Su-
preme Court will be forced to allow the tax instruction as well as
evidence of taxation in future FELA actions brought in Montana
courts.
Since Liepelt is not binding on state court adjudications in-
volving state substantive law, the Montana Supreme Court is free
to adopt its own rule in these cases. That the Montana Supreme
Court has specifically rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Boxberger,100 on which the Liepelt court relied, suggests that the
Leipelt decision will not persuade the Montana court to adopt the
Liepelt rule in state substantive law cases.
C. Problems Associated with Punitive Damage Awards
In some instances a jury may find that punitive damages
should be awarded. "Where the acts complained of are shown to be
wanton, malicious, or oppressive and of such a character as to indi-
cate a reckless disregard for the rights of the plaintiff, the jury, in
their discretion, may award a reasonable amount as punitive dam-
ages, in addition to compensatory damages."1"1 Tax consequences
associated with punitive damage awards may necessitate special
jury instruction considerations.
1. Plaintiff
In the past, both punitive and compensatory damages awarded
96. Id. at 75, 343 P.2d at 853.
97. 174 Mont. 83, 568 P.2d 558 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978). Accord Mc-
Gee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 174 Mont. 466, 571 P.2d 784 (1977).
98. Torchia, 174 Mont. at 96, 568 P.2d at 566.
99. Id. at 96-97, 568 P.2d at 566.
100. Id.
101. Ramsbacher v. Hohman, 80 Mont. 480, 489, 261 P. 273, 277 (1927).
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for personal injuries were considered to be excludable from the
plaintiff's gross income.' 2 In light of Revenue Ruling 84-108,"o3
however, it is no longer safe to say that all damages awarded to the
plaintiff in a personal injury or wrongful death action are tax-free.
If a defendant wishes to instruct the jury as to the taxation of an
award to the plaintiff when punitive damages are justified, the
court ought to instruct that only the compensatory damages will
not be subject to tax.
The problem with instructing a jury that one element of dam-
ages will be excludable from the plaintiff's income while another is
not is that this could be confusing. Ultimately, however, this
should not be determinative. Competent lawyers and judges ought
to be able to phrase instructions effectively in a form understanda-
ble by juries.0
The important point is that plaintiff's counsel should not be
caught unaware of the change in the I.R.S.'s position with respect
to punitive damages. Thus, in a case where the judge must instruct
the jury regarding tax consequences to the plaintiff, plaintiff's
counsel may want the jury to be instructed that not all of the
award will be tax-free.
2. Defendants
If a jury decides that punitive damages are warranted, calcula-
tion of the amount is largely left to the jury's discretion.10 5 How-
ever, some general rules exist:
The jury should take into consideration the attendant circum-
stances, such as the malice or wantonness of the act, the injury
intended, the motive for the act, the manner in which it was com-
mitted and the deterrent effect upon others.. . . According to the
general rule, it is proper for the jury to consider defendant's
wealth and pecuniary ability in fixing the amount of damages.0 6
102. See text accompanying note 19.
103. 1984-29 I.R.B. 5. See note 20 and accompanying text.
104. The argument that jury instructions on income taxes would be too confusing was
addressed in Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 494. The Supreme Court noted that many variables make
a jury's decision difficult:
But the practical wisdom of the trial bar and the trial bench has developed effec-
tive methods of presenting the essential elements of an expert calculation in a
form that is understandable by juries that are increasingly familiar with the com-
plexities of modern life. We therefore reject the notion that the instruction of
evidence describing a decedent's after-tax earnings is too speculative or complex
for a jury.
Id.
105. Ramsbacher, 80 Mont. at 489, 261 P. at 277.
106. Id. (quoting 17 C.J. 994, 995 (1927)) (emphasis added).
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Both compensatory and punitive damages are deductible for
income tax purposes if the claim arises from ordinary and neces-
sary activities associated with carrying on a trade or business or
with maintaining property to produce income. 107 Since the objec-
tive in awarding compensatory damages is to make the plaintiff
whole, the fact that the defendant may deduct these damages in
computing his taxable income is irrelevant.108
Punitive damages, however, present a different situation. The
objective in awarding punitive damages is to punish. If a jury de-
termines that a defendant ought to pay $1,000,000 in punishment
for its act, it would be relevant for the jury to know that the award
may cost the defendant only about one half that amount in after-
tax income.
IV. CONCLUSION
Tax consequences surrounding personal injury and wrongful
death cases are significant and becoming more complex. While all
damages or settlements arising from personal injury litigation have
historically been excluded from a plaintiff's gross income, the
I.R.S. has begun to scrutinize whether all personal injury damages
should be accorded this treatment. On the other hand, nearly all
damages paid by a defendant remain tax-deductible, if the litiga-
tion arises from ordinary and necessary trade, business, or invest-
ment activities.
The fact that most people are unaware of these tax conse-
quences suggests that evidence and jury instructions concerning in-
come taxes would be helpful in making verdict decisions. More-
over, the possibility of a large verdict makes this a significant issue.
There are legitimate arguments to be made both for and
against admitting evidence and giving instruction on tax conse-
quences. Many state courts do not allow juries to hear evidence
107. See text accompanying notes 24-35.
108. A recent Minnesota decision is interesting. In Hanson v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. R.R. Co., - Minn. -, 345 N.W.2d 736 (1984), the plaintiff requested that the jury
be instructed that any damages awarded against the defendant would be fully tax-deducti-
ble. The jury awarded $500,000. The trial court believed the verdict was too high, and it
granted a remittitur. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that the instruction merely informed
the jurors that the award would not be a nondeductible penalty. The court believed this was
unnecessary, stating that "[s]ince the jury is already told that damages are to be awarded
that will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for his injury, it is unclear why more
needs to be said." Id. at 738. While the instruction might have informed a jury that the
award would not penalize the defendant, it tended to encourage the jury to increase the
amount of the award at government expense. Id. at 739. Only compensatory damages were
involved in Hanson; thus, the court had no reason to discuss whether this type of instruc-
tion could properly be given with respect to punitive damages.
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and instructions regarding taxes. In recent years, however, federal
courts have moved in the other direction. If a jury has neither the
information nor the knowledge to properly award damages, com-
pensatory damages will likely acquire a punitive effect, while puni-
tive damages will not punish. Therefore, the trend initiated by the
federal courts should be extended so as to fully inform the jury
about the tax consequences of the damages they award. State
courts should follow suit in a manner that is reflective of their sub-
stantive law, yet allow the jury to make as informed a decision as is
possible in awarding damages.
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